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PARITY IN SOUTH CAROLINA RECIDIVIST SENTENCING:
STATE v. GORDON
I. INTRODUCTION
Should a court sentence an offender with multiple convictions stemming from
offenses committed close in time as a recidivist? Two provisions of the South
Carolina Code, when read together, answer this question in the negative. The
state's recidivist statute, section 17-25-45, imposes a sentence of life in prison
without the possibly of parole, under certain circumstances, on a repeat offender
who has committed a "serious" or "most serious" offense.' The second provision,
section 17-25-50, ostensibly governs counting a defendant's offenses for the
purpose of imposing a recidivist sentence. Section 17-25-50 tells courts to treat
offenses committed close in time as one offense.2 Despite the clear relation of these
two statutory sections, South Carolina courts have not always read them together.
In State v. Benjamin, the South Carolina Supreme Court held that section 17-
25-50's "close in time" rule did not apply to the recidivist statute, and therefore,
multiple offenses should always count separately for sentencing purposes, no matter
how closely in time they may have occurred.3 Only a few months later, however,
the supreme court overruled Benjamin in State v. Gordon, holding that sections 17-
25-45 and 17-25-50 must be construed together, so that crimes committed at points
close in time might count as a single offense for purposes of sentencing under the
recidivist statute.
Part H of this Note explains State v. Benjamin, the applicable authority prior to
Gordon. Part H explores the Gordon decision and the current South Carolina
law-offenses committed closely in time will be treated as one offense for recidivist
sentencing purposes. Part IV argues that the court's holding in Gordon is correct
because it implements the intent of the South Carolina General Assembly,
effectuates sound public policy, and follows established expectations regarding the
law. Part V discusses imprecision in section 17-25-50, while Part VI provides a
solution that addresses the ambiguous language of section 17-25-50 and clarifies its
relation to the recidivist statute.
I1. STATE V. BENJAMIN
The facts of Benjamin are straightforward, but raise a critical issue regarding the
relation between section 17-25-50 and South Carolina's recidivist statute. In May
1997, Franklin Benjamin robbed a Citgo convenience store.' During the commission
of the robbery, he shot and killed one of the Citgo employees." Approximately four
hours later, Benjamin robbed a Dodge's convenience store.7 His trials were separate
for each incident! A jury convicted him of murder and armed robbery for the Citgo
1. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-50 (West 2003).
3. State v. Benjamin, 353 S.C. 441,445, 579 S.E.2d 289, 291 (2003).
4. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 154, 588 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2003).
5. State v. Benjamin, 345 S.C. 470,473, 549 S.E.2d 258, 260 (2001).
6. Id.
7. Benjamin, 353 S.C. at 442, 579 S.E.2d at 289; State v. Benjamin, 341 S.C. 160, 162, 533
S.E.2d 606, 607 (Ct. App. 2000).
8. Benjamin, 353 S.C. at 443, 579 S.E.2d at 290.
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incident.' Approximately one month later, a jury convicted him of armed robbery for
the Dodge's incident.10 At the end of his second trial, the court took into account
Benjamin's prior conviction for the Citgo incident and sentenced him to life in prison
without the possibility of parole under the recidivist statute."
Benjamin appealed his sentence, contending that the legislature did not intend
to impose recidivist sentencing under section 17-25-45 up on an individual who had
engaged in one continuous course of criminal conduct. Benjamin supported his
contention by arguing that the court should read section 17-25-45 in light of section
17-25-50. The court of appeals rejected this argument and affirmed the trial court's
decision, and the South Carolina Supreme Court subsequently affirmed that
holding.
13
The supreme court based its holding on the precise language of section 17-25-45,
subsections (A), (B), and (F):
(A) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except in cases in
which the death penalty is imposed, upon a conviction for a
most serious offense as defined by this section, a person must
be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole if that person has one or more prior
convictions for:
(1) a most serious offense;
(2) a federal or out-of-state conviction for an
offense that would be classified as a most
serious offense under this section; or
(3) any combination of the offenses listed in
items (1) and (2) above.
(B) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except in cases in
which the death penalty is imposed, upon a conviction for a
serious offense as defined by this section, a person must be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without the
possibility of parole if that person has two or more prior
convictions for:
(1) a serious offense;
(2) a most serious offense;
(3) a federal or out-of-state offense that would be
classified as a serious offense or most serious
offense under this section; or
(4) any combination of the offenses listed in items
(1), (2), and (3) above....
(F) For the purpose of determining a prior conviction under this
section only, a prior conviction shall mean the defendant has
been convicted of a most serious or serious offense, as may be
applicable, on a separate occasion, prior to the instant
adjudication.' 4
9. Benjamin, 345 S.C. at 473, 549 S.E.2d at 260.
10. Benjamin, 341 S.C. at 162, 533 S.E.2d at 607.
11. Id.
12. Benjamin, 353 S.C. at 443, 579 S.E.2d at 290.
13. Id. at 443-45, 579 S.E.2d at 290-91.
14. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
[Vol. 56: 723
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Benjamin argued that the court should read section 17-25-45(F) to require
separate, temporally distinct offenses-rather than merely separate, temporally
distinct convictions-to trigger the recidivist statute with respect to a given
offender." The court disagreed, noting that subsection (F) speaks clearly in terms
of convictions. 16 Also, the court stated that the legislature did not intend for courts
to read section 17-25-45 with section 17-25-50 so as to permit offenses committed
closely in time to count as a single offense.' 7 Prior to the adoption of section 17-25-
45, section 17-25-40, a substantially similar recidivist sentencing provision, was in
effect."8 According to precedent, courts read section 17-25-40 in light of section 17-
25-50."9 The Benjamin court noted, however, a critical difference between section
17-25-45 and its predecessor, section 17-25-40. The newer provision, unlike its
predecessor, began with the words "'[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law.""'2 The court reasoned that the legislature did not intend for courts to read the
newer provision in conjunction with any other provision, including section 17-25-
50.21 The court buttressed its holding by referring to subsections (E) and (F) of
section 17-25-45. Both begin with similar language limiting references to other
provisions.22 As a result, the majority concluded that the court properly sentenced
Benjamin to life in prison without the possibility of parole, based on the separate
convictions arising from his 1997 crime spree.a 1
A strong Benjamin dissent mirrored the holding in State v. Woody,24 a 2001 court
of appeals' decision that stated that the legislature did not intend to subject
individuals convicted of offenses stemming from one crime spree to recidivist
sentencing. First, the Benjamin dissent argued that the purpose of recidivist
sentencing is to punish only repeat offenders. 26 Section 17-25-45, on its own, could
cover perpetrators of single crime sprees, who are not true repeat offenders, and thus
expand the intended scope of recidivist sentencing.27 Second, the dissent argued that,
because courts read the predecessor to section 17-25-45 in light of section 17-25-50,
and because Woody did not find anything to suggest that section 17-25-45(F)
abrogated section 17-25-50, courts should also read section 17-25-45 in light of
section 17-25-50.2 Finally, the dissent argued that the majority's reading of the
statute would allow the solicitor unfettered discretion to treat defendants differently
by electing to try charges together or separately. 29 The dissent would have held
Benjamin ineligible for an enhanced sentence under the recidivist statute.3"
15. Benjamin, 353 S.C. at 444, 579 S.E.2d at 290.
16. State v. Benjamin, 353 S.C. 441,444, 579 S.E.2d 289, 290 (2003).
17. Id. at 445, 579 S.E.2d at 291.
18. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-25-40 (repealed 1982).
19. State v. Stewart, 275 S.C. 447, 452-53 n.2, 272 S.E.2d 628, 631 n.2 (1980).
20. Benjamin, 353 S.C. at 445, 579 S.E.2d at 291 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45).
21. Id.
22. Id. Section 17-25-45(E) begins "[flor the purpose of this section only .... " Similarly
section 17-25-45(F) states "[flor the purpose of determining a prior conviction under this section
only,...."
23. Id.
24. 345 S.C. 34, 545 S.E.2d 521 (Ct. App. 2001).
25. State v. Benjamin, 353 S.C. 441, 445-49, 579 S.E.2d 289, 291-93 (2003) (Waller, J.,
dissenting).
26. Id. at 446, 579 S.E.2d at 291.
27. Id. at 446, 579 S.E.2d at 291-92.
28. Id. at 447, 579 S.E.2d at 292.
29. Id. at 448-49, 579 S.E.2d at 292-93.
30. Id. at 449, 579 S.E.2d at 293.
2005]
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Il. STATE V. GORDON
Most recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Benjamin in State
v. Gordon, holding that courts must construe sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-50
together so that crimes committed closely in time count as only one offense for
purposes of recidivist sentencing."' Like Benjamin, the facts of Gordon are
straightforward but raise the critical issue regarding the relationship of section 17-25-
45 to section 17-25-50. In 1997, ajury convicted Willie Gordon of trafficking crack
cocaine.32 The bases for his conviction were acts he performed "on or about
September 21st through September 23rd, 1996."" 3 Again in 2000, the state issued
an indictment charging Gordon with trafficking crack cocaine. 4 The 2000
indictment included a conspiracy allegation, which was substantially similar to a
count that Gordon's 1997 indictment originally included.3" The earlier count was
"nol prossed with the right to restore. 36 A jury convicted Gordon on the conspiracy
charge in February 2001 .3 The State moved for an enhanced sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole under section 17-25-45.3" The trial court,
however, held that Gordon was not subject to the recidivist statute, because the
crimes underlying his two convictions were "so closely connected" in time that they
should count as only one conviction for sentencing purposes, in accordance with
section 17-25-50.39 Thus, the court declined to impose life in prison without the
possibility of parole.' The State appealed this decision to the South Carolina
Supreme Court. The South Carolina Supreme Court overruled Benjamin and upheld
the trial court's application of section 17-25-50 to Gordon's case.4' In overruling
Benjamin, the court explained that the earlier decision contravened legislative intent,
prior precedent, and the purpose of recidivist sentencing.42
The Gordon majority stated that the rule from Benjamin was contrary to
legislative intent, because courts usually construe penal statutes in the defendant's
favor, and section 17-25-50 would be a nullity if it were not applicable in
conjunction with section 17-25-45.43 The court relied on two additional reasons from
the Benjamin dissenters. First, the court noted that the purpose of recidivist
sentencing is to punish only repeat offenders, and section 17-25-45, on its own,
would cover perpetrators of continuing crimes, who are not true repeat offenders, and
thus expand the intended scope of recidivist sentencing." Second, the court
explained that since courts read the predecessor to section 17-25-45 in light of
31. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 154-55, 588 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2003).
32. Id. at 147, 588 S.E.2d at 107.
33. Id.
34; Id.
35. Id. at 148, 588 S.E.2d at 107.
36. Id. at 148 n.2, 588 S.E.2d at 107 n.2.
37. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 148, 588 S.E.2d 105, 107 (2003).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 148, 588 S.E.2d at 107-08.
40. Id. at 148-49, 588 S.E.2d at 108.
41. Id. at 154-55, 588 S.E.2d at 111. The relevant statute provides:
In determining the number of offenses for the purpose of imposition of sentence,
the court shall treat as one offense any number of offenses which have been
committed at times so closely connected in point of time that they may be
considered as one offense, notwithstanding under the law they constitute separate
and distinct offenses.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-50 (West 2003).
42. Gordon, 356 S.C. at 146-56, 588 S.E.2d at 106-12.
43. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 153, 588 S.E.2d 105, 110 (2003).
44. Id. at 154-55, 588 S.E.2d at 110-11.
[Vol. 56: 723
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section 17-25-50, and nothing in the newer version abrogated section 17-25-50,
courts should read section 17-25-45 in light of section 17-25-50."5
The strong dissent in Gordon noted two reasons why section 17-25-50 should
not apply to recidivist sentencing under section 17-25-45. First, the dissent argued
that the language-"'[n]otwithstanding any other provision of
law"-unambiguously represents the legislature's intent to prohibit the application
of section 17-25-50 to section 17-25-45.' Second, the dissent urged that stare
decisis required the Gordon court to follow Benjamin.47
In light of the court's quick reversal of itself and the strong dissents in both
cases, the following question is left unanswered: Was Gordon or Benjamin the better
decision?
IV. STATE v. GORDON WAS THE BETrER DECISION
The Gordon court correctly overruled Benjamin and thus placed the ideals of
Woody back into effect; two offenses committed closely in time should be treated as
one offense for sentencing purposes. This proposition finds support in legislative
intent, public policy, and prior expectations regarding the law.
A. Legislative Intent
The legislature intended for courts to read section 17-25-45 in light of section
17-25-50. This conclusion follows from an examination of the purpose of the
recidivist statute, the historical treatment and changes in the language of these code
sections, and the treatment of offenses committed closely in time in other provisions
of the South Carolina Code.
The intended purpose of section 17-25-45 indicates that courts should read it in
conjunction with section 17-25-50. Section 17-25-45 is a recidivist statute. The
Gordon court defined a recidivist statute in the following way: "Recidivist legislation
attempts to encourage offenders to stay out of trouble and punishes those who refuse
to be deterred even after a conviction."" The purpose of a recidivist statute is to
punish only repeat offenders who make "'a trade of crime."' 49 One way to ensure
the fulfillment of this legislative purpose is to avoid punishing offenders who courts
may have convicted of multiple offenses that arose from a single crime spree.
Indeed, the Gordon court reasoned that the recidivist sentencing provision should
apply only to an offender who has "participated in multiple criminal trials and,
despite these opportunities to understand the gravity of his behavior and abide by the
law, has continued to engage in criminal conduct."
Thus, if recidivist sentencing did not factor in section 17-25-50, then offenders
such as Benjamin and Gordon, who have multiple convictions from one incident,
could receive recidivist sentences, even though they are not true repeat offenders in
45. Id. at 153, 588 S.E.2d at 110.
46. Id. at 155, 588 S.E.2d at 111 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45) (Burnett, J., dissenting
in part).
47. Id. at 155-56, 588 S.E.2d at 111-12.
48. Id. at 154, 588 S.E.2d at 110 (quoting State v. Benjamin, 353 S.C. 441,446, 579 S.E.2d 289,
291 (2003)) (Waller, J., dissenting).
49. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 154, 588 S.E.2d 105, 111 (2003) (quoting Benjamin, 353 S.C.
at 446, 579 S.E.2d at 291) (Waller, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
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the sense of having returned to crime after a conviction. The legislature could not
have intended such a possible overreaching result.
In addition, legislative history indicates that courts should read section 17-25-45
in light of section 17-25-50. The predecessor to section 17-25-45 was section 17-25-
40. In State v. Stewart, the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that courts must
read sections 17-25-40 and 17-25-50 together, because two offenses committed
closely in time should count as one for sentencing purposes.5 ' Since courts had to
read section 17-25-45's predecessor in conjunction with section 17-25-50, and since
the adoption of section 17-25-45 did not repeal section 17-25-50, the logical
conclusion is that courts must read section 17-25-45 in conjunction with section 17-
25-50 as well.
The changes made from section 17-25-40 to section 17-25-45 do not warrant an
alteration of this relationship. Section 17-25-40 stated:
In case anyone whose combined convictions under the law of any
state, including this State, or of the United States, of the crime of
murder, voluntary manslaughter, rape, armed robbery, highway
robbery, assault with intent to ravish, bank robbery, arson, burglary
or safecracking, or its intent, amount to as many as three, be
convicted under the laws of this State of one of the above crimes,
he shall be subjected to the maximum sentence provided for such
crime. The maximum sentence shall be life for any person
convicted for the fourth time of any such crime. 2
Section 17-25-45 made several changes from section 17-25-40. First, section 17-25-
45 lists "serious" offenses and "most serious" offenses and details the number and
type of prior convictions needed to trigger this statute. 53 For example, if a court
convicts an offender of murder, which according to section 17-25-45 is a "most
serious" offense, and the State wants to enhance the offender's sentence under the
recidivist statute, section 17-25-45 requires that this offender have a prior conviction
for (1) another "most serious" offense, "(2) a federal or out-of-state conviction for
an offense that would be classified as a most serious offense under this section," or
(3) "any combination of the offenses listed in items (1) or (2) above. 54 Section 17-
25-40 did not divide its listed offenses into categories but simply provided for the
imposition of an enhanced sentence for a fourth conviction of a listed offense.55
Second, section 17-25-45 decreases the number of convictions needed to trigger a
heightened sentence, thus easing the burden on prosecutors seeking to obtain such
sentences. Third, subparagraphs (D) and (E) of section 17-25-45 detail particular
circumstances when an offender sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole is eligible for consideration of parole. Section 17-25-40 contained only one
sentence concerning the possibility of parole: "Nothing herein contained shall
prohibit a review of a life sentence by the Probation, Parole and Pardon Board as
51. State v. Stewart, 275 S.C. 447, 452-53 n.2, 272 S.E.2d 628, 631 n.2 (1980).
52. Id. at 452, 272 S.E.2d at 630 (referencing S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976),
repealed by 1982 S.C. Acts 358 § 3).
53. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004).
54. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(A) (West 2003).
55. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-40 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (repealed 1982).
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now provided by law." 8 Fourth, section 17-25-45(F) provides a definition of prior
conviction; section 17-25-40 did not define this term. 9 Finally, section 17-25-45
includes the language "[n]otwithstanding any other provision..." in subsections (A)
and (B).
60
The first three changes described above do not implicate any change in the
application of section 17-25-50 to recidivist sentencing. A possible interpretation of
changes four and five is that they abrogate the application of section 17-25-50, much
like the interpretation in Benjamin. Subsection (F) states that the only requirement
for a recidivist sentence is a conviction that occurred on a separate, prior occasion.6 '
Thus, in a case such as Benjamin, the Citgo conviction would count as a prior
conviction even though Benjamin committed the underlying offenses closely in time.
Section 17-25-40 had no such provision, thus, the "close in time" rule from section
17-25-50 did not conflict with the language of section 17-25-40 the way it conflicts
with the language of section 17-25-45(F). Next, the plain meaning of
"notwithstanding any other provision.. ." in (A) and (B) prevents the application of
any other provision in conjunction with section 17-25-45.62 Nevertheless, the
legislature could not have intended for courts to apply these last two modifications
literally.
Subsection 17-25-45(F) simplydefines which convictions are prior to the current
conviction for purposes of subsections (A) and (B). 61 Section 17-25-50 specifies
which convictions count together as one conviction for recidivist sentencing
purposes." This interpretation of subsection (F) and section 17-25-50 helps a
defendant just convicted of a "serious" offense and potentially facing a recidivist
sentence under section 17-25-45(B) because he has two prior convictions. If these
two prior convictions arose from offenses committed closely in time, they would be
"prior" under section 17-25-45(F) but would count as only one conviction under
section 17-25-50. Because section 17-25-45(B) requires an offender to have two
prior convictions, this defendant could escape recidivist sentencing. On the other
hand, this interpretation would not help a defendant like Benjamin or Gordon whom
courts sentenced under section 17-25-45(A). That subsection requires only one prior
conviction, so past convictions cannot be combined. If, in such a case, a defendant
tried to combine a single prior conviction with his current conviction so as to count
them as a single conviction under section 17-25-50, then section 17-25-45(F), which
defines prior convictions, would be meaningless. This scenario demonstrates that the
legislature could not have intended a literal interpretation of subsection (F). Such an
interpretation would punish defendants as recidivists even though they never
committed any crimes after a conviction. According to the court in Gordon, "Courts
will reject the plain and ordinary meaning of statutory language when to accept it
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-40 (repealed 1982).
59. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(F) (West 2003).
60. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(A) & (B) (West 2003).
61. S.C. CODEANN. § 17-25-45(F) (West 2003).
62. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(A) & (B) (West 2003).
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(F) (West 2003).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-50 (West 2003) speaks in terms of "offenses." In contrast, section
17-25-45 speaks in terms of "convictions." Nevertheless, one can read the two sections together. The
older statute, section 17-25-40, also spoke in terms of convictions, but South Carolina courts had no
difficulty meshing that provision with the offenses language of section 17-25-50. See S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 17-25-45 (West 2003 & Supp. 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-50 (West 2003); State v. Stewart, 275
S.C. 447, 452, 272 S.E.2d 628, 630 (1980); S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-40 (repealed 1982).
2005]
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would lead to a result so absurd that it could not possibly have been intended by [the
legislature, or would defeat plain legislative intention.... ,,65
In addition, another South Carolina Code section reveals that the legislature must
have intended for courts to read sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-50 together. Section
24-21-640 governs the parole-granting process." Under this section, a parole board
may not grant parole to a "prisoner serving a sentence for a second or subsequent
conviction" for certain violent crimes. 7 The provision, however, goes on to impose
its own "close in time" rule which states that "where more than one included offense
shall be committed within a one-day period or pursuant to one continuous course of
conduct, such multiple offenses shall be treated for purposes of this section as one
offense. '6 The legislature could not have intended for the parole board to treat
offenses close in time as one offense but for courts not to do so when imposing a
sentence.
In conclusion, the legislature could not possibly have intended to punish a person
as a recidivist if the person participated in only a single crime spree. The legislature
surely intended to punish as recidivists only incorrigible criminals who perpetrate
crimes, get convicted, and then go out and perpetrate more crimes.
B. Public Policy and Expectations
Beyond legislative intent, public policy and established expectations regarding
the law support the contention that courts should read sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-
50 together. Reading 17-25-45 independently of section 17-25-50 allows for
different treatment of similarly situated defendants, thus giving rise to possible equal
protection issues. Whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole could depend solely on prosecutorial discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion, though expansive, is not limitless. The judiciary can
contravene the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when exercise of the discretion
violates a defendant's constitutional rights. "For example, the judiciary may infringe
on prosecutorial discretion [when] the prosecutor bases the decision to prosecute on
unjustifiable standards such as race, religion, or other arbitrary factors.
69
Assume two defendants commit armed robbery, murder, and rape in one night,
and neither has a past criminal record. However, the prosecutor decides with respect
to the first defendant to try each of his offenses separately. On the other hand, the
prosecutor chooses to try the second defendant's offenses jointly. Following a
conviction of the first defendant for armed robbery and subsequent convictions for
murder and rape, the state could move for life in prison without the possibility of
parole upon his conviction for rape, because he has two prior convictions under
section 17-25-45(F). However, the state cannot move for an enhanced sentence for
the second defendant because, even given convictions on all three offenses, he will
not have any prior convictions under section 17-25-45(F). Thus, the prosecutor has
direct control over the eligibility of each defendant for a recidivist sentence. The
legislature could not have intended the availability of recidivist sentencing to hinge
solely on prosecutorial bias. If the "close in time" rule of section 17-25-50 applied
to both defendants' cases, neither defendant would be eligible for a recidivist
65. State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 152-53,588 S.E.2d 105, 110 (2003) (citing Joseph v. State,
351 S.C. 551, 562, 571 S.E.2d 280,285 (2002)).
66. S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-21-640 (Law. Co-op. 1989 & West Supp. 2004).
67. Id
68. Id.
69. Exparte Littlefield, 343 S.C. 212,219, 540 S.E.2d 81, 84 (2000).
[Vol. 56: 723
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sentence, and the prosecutor could not manipulate the timing of the trials to make
either one of them eligible. Thus, applying section 17-25-50 ensures similar
treatment of similarly situated defendants.
In addition, applying section 17-25-50 preserves expectations regarding the law.
State v. Woody was the first relevant case after the adoption of section 17-25-45. °
In that case, the court of appeals vacated the defendant's sentence of life in prison
without the possibility of parole, because section 17-25-50, as applied to his
convictions, required the court to count his convictions, which were closely
connected in time, as one conviction.7 1 Following Woody and prior to Benjamin,
courts, prosecutors, and defendants, through the aid of their attorneys, had an
expectation that section 17-25-50 applied in conjunction with the new recidivist
statute, just as it had with the prior recidivist statute. Quite certainly, parties relied
on these expectations. For example, assume that an attorney represented a client who
had committed two armed robberies. The incidents occurred within a couple of
hours of one another but at two different locations. The prosecutor tried the
defendant separately for each offense. After the defendant's conviction for the first
armed robbery, his attorney counseled him to plead guilty to the second armed
robbery, believing that these two offenses would count as one for sentencing
purposes and his client would thus not be subject to recidivist sentencing. In
advising his client this way, the attorney rejected another option: plea bargaining for
a sentence short of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole-the sentence
that the recidivist statute mandated. The rejection of this option made sense after
Woody, in which the court of appeals held that recidivist sentencing would not apply
to a case involving offenses committed closely in time. However, when the supreme
court overruled Woody in the Benjamin case, it upset this strategy. In the example
above, if section 17-25-50 was not applicable, as the Benjamin court ruled, the court
could sentence the client to life in prison without the possibility of parole, while he
could have avoided this sentence by taking the plea bargain if he had known that the
law would suddenly change course.72
Gordon was correct in that it adhered to the established expectations under the
old recidivist statute, section 17-25-40, and the established expectations under
Woody.73 This does not mean that a court can never overrule a previous decision or
change a rule of law because doing so would infiringe on the expectations of others.
However, the court should have a reason for doing so. For example, if the legislature
repealed section 17-25-50 when it adopted section 17-25-45, this action would
clearly indicate that courts should ignore prior expectations about recidivist
sentencing. This may be a reason for the court to overrule Woody and establish new
expectations regarding recidivist sentencing. However, the legislature did not repeal
section 17-25-50, and expectations concerning its application were still in effect.
70. State v. Woody, 345 S.C. 34, 34,545 S.E.2d 521,521 (Ct. App. 2001), aff'd, 359 S.C. 1,596
S.E.2d 907 (2004).
71. Id. at 37-38, 545 S.E.2d at 522.
72. In addition to the type qf harm just described, each time the law changes and an attorney is
not aware of the change, a flood of post conviction relief actions is possible based on a Sixth
Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Generally, "[a]n error by counsel, even if
professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if
the error had no effect on the judgment." Strickland v, Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984). In the
context of recidivist sentencing, courts may view an error by counsel on whether offenses will count
as one or two could be seen as having an effect on the judgment, thus increasing the number of post
conviction relief actions.
73. See State v. Gordon, 356 S.C. 143, 143, 588 S.E.2d 105, 105 (2003); see also State v.
Woody, 359 S.C. 1,596 S.E.2d 907 (2004), aj-g, 345 S.C. 34, 545 S.E.2d 521 (Ct. App. 2001).
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In conclusion, the Gordon holding, which construed sections 17-25-45 and 17-
25-50 together, ensures that similarly situated defendants receive similar treatment
and follows the expectations of courts, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and other
individuals.
V. A PROBLEM REMAINS AFTER GORDON: SECTION 17-25-50 Is AMBIGUOUS
Even if courts read sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-50 together, one problem
remains. The "close in time" standard that section 17-25-50 imposes is ambiguous.7 4
The statute never defines "close in time." The South Carolina Supreme Court
characterized the term as referring to a "single chain of circumstances"" and to
events that are "related in detail and continuity."76 Even these refinements are
ambiguous, however. For example, suppose John is tailgating at a football game
when he and another man get into an argument. John assaults the man and leaves the
game. Much later that evening, after John had gone home and calmed down, he goes
to a bar to meet friends. John runs into the man from the football game, and they
again start to argue. John then goes to his car, grabs his gun, shoots, and kills the
other man. First, a grand jury indicts John for assault and battery with the intent to
kill, stemming from the football game incident. The grand jury also indicts John for
murder. If the courts try John separately for these offenses, whether they are so close
in time to constitute one offense for the purposes of sentencing is unclear. This
question is difficult for a judge to answer, and others will not easily predict the
answer to the question. One judge may treat John's offenses as one because the two
offenses stemmed from the defendant's issues with a single man on the same day.
On the other hand, anotherjudge may treat John's offenses separately, because John
had time to cool off in between the incidents.
VI. AN AMENDMENT COULD RESOLVE THE AMBIGUITY OF SECTION 17-25-50
The following amendment to section 17-25-45(F) wouldboth clarify the relation
of sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-50 and resolve the ambiguity of section 17-25-50:
For purposes of subsections (A) and (B), a conviction may count
as a second prior conviction only if the defendant committed the
underlying offense after having pled guilty to or having been
convicted of a previous offense, notwithstanding under the law
they constitute separate and distinct offenses. For purposes of
subsection (A), a prior conviction will count toward a recidivist
sentence only if the defendant's current conviction arises from an
offense committed after having pled guilty to or having been
convicted of the prior conviction.
74. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-50 (West 2003).
75. State v. Middleton, 288 S.C. 21, 23, 339 S.E.2d 692, 693 (1986).
76. State v. Bikle, 180 S.C. 400, 410, 185 S.E. 753, 758 (1936).
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Other states, such as North Carolina77 and Georgia," provide similar standards.
These states count offenses toward life in prison without the possibility of parole
only if the defendants committed the offenses after a conviction for or a guilty plea
to aprior offense. In additionto amending section 17-25-45(F), repealing section 17-
25-50 would avoid confusion concerning its relation to section 17-25-45. Also,
section 17-25-50 does not address anything that the amendment to section 17-25-
45(F) does not clarify. First, amending section 17-25-45(F) addresses the language
in section 17-25-50, "[iln determining the number of offenses for the purposes of
imposition of sentence,' 79 because section 17-25-45 as a whole deals with the
imposition of a sentence, and subsection (F) deals with which offenses count as prior
convictions. The amending language in section 17-25-45(F), "only if the defendant
committed the underlying offense after having pled guilty to or having been
convicted of a previous offense" resolves the next phrase in section 17-25-50, "the
court shall treat as one offense any number of offenses which have been committed
at times so closely connected in point of time that they may be considered as one
offense.""0 The amending language delineates verbatim the final phrase in section
17-25-50, "notwithstanding under the law they constitute separate and distinct
offenses."
81
This amendment allows offenses to count separately for recidivist sentencing
purposes only in the event of an intervening conviction. In so doing, it replaces the
ambiguous "close in time" standard with a bright-line rule that effectuates the same
purpose.
The proposed amendment, if adopted, would ease a court's analysis of a multi-
offense scenario. For example, on November 1, 1995, John breaks into a house and
takes some jewelry. A week later, John remembers that he left one of his gloves in
the house and decides that, since the owners are still on vacation, he will return and
burn down the house to destroy the evidence. John burns down the house on
November 10, 1995. The following week, a grand jury indicts John for second-
degree burglary as well as second-degree arson. The prosecutor tries the two
offenses separately. A court convicts John of second-degree burglary on January 1,
1996 and of second-degree arson on March 1, 1996. In 2004, a court tries John
again for second-degree burglary based on a separate, later incident, and the
prosecution seeks, under section 17-25-45, a sentence of life in prison without the
possibility of parole.
In this case, the court must first ascertain whether the offense John is currently
being convicted of a "serious" or "most serious" offense. Under section 17-25-
45(C)(2)(b), second-degree burglary is a "serious" offense. The court then must
determine what combination of prior convictions warrants imposing the harsh
sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Under section 17-25-
77. The North Carolina statute provides:
The commission of a second felony shall not fall within the purview of this
Article unless it is committed after the conviction of or plea of guilty to the first
felony. The commission of a third felony shall not fall within the purview of this
Article unless it is committed after the conviction of or plea of guilty to the
second felony.
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-7.1 (2003).
78. The Georgia statute requires that a person "who after such first conviction subsequently
commits and is convicted of a serious violent felony for which such person is not sentenced to death
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life without parole." GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7(b)(2) (2004).
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45(B), to impose life in prison without the possibility of parole, John must have "two
or more prior convictions for: (1) a serious offense; (2) a most serious offense; (3)
a federal or out-of-state offense that would be classified as a serious offense or most
serious offense... ; or (4) any combination of the offenses... above. 82 John has
two prior convictions for "serious" offenses. However, before determining a
sentence, the court must look to amended subsection (F) to determine how to count
these two prior convictions. John committed the second offense before he pled guilty
to or was convicted of the first offense; thus, John's prior offenses will count as one
offense. Since John has only one prior conviction of a serious offense, he cannot be
subject to an enhanced sentence under subsection (B), which requires two or more
prior convictions.
The analysis of a scenario applying section 17-25-45(A) would be similar to the
analysis employed above. For example, one evening John commits two murders
within hours of each other in two different locations. The prosecutor elects to try
these two °murders separately. A court convicts John for the first murder.
Subsequently, a court tries John for the second murder, and the prosecutor asks for
a recidivist sentence upon conviction. Under section 17-25-45(C)(1), murder is a
most serious offense; thus, section 17-25-45(A) is applicable. According to section
17-25-45(A), a court may impose a recidivist sentence if that person has "one or
more prior convictions for: (1) a most serious offense; (2) a federal or out-of-state
conviction for an offense that would be classified as a most serious offense under this
section; or (3) any combination of the offenses listed in items (1) and (2) above."8 3
John has a prior conviction for a most serious offense, but before determining a
sentence, the court must look to amended subsection (F) to determine if this prior
conviction can count toward a recidivist sentence. John committed the second
murder before he pled guilty to or was convicted of the first murder. Thus, according
to amended subsection (F), John's prior conviction for the first murder cannot count
toward a recidivist sentence. The court cannot impose a recidivist sentence of life
in prison without the possibility of parole in this situation.
VII. CONCLUSION
In State v. Gordon, the South Carolina Supreme Court correctly held that courts
should read sections 17-25-45 and 17-25-50 in conjunction with one another. This
holding effectuates the legislature's intent. Reading these sections separately would
frustrate the purpose of the recidivist statute, allow for differing treatment of
similarly situated defendants, and contravene expectations regarding the law.
Whether to read these sections together is not the only problem concerning the
application of recidivist principles. Section 17-25-50 is also ambiguous.
Fortunately, a simple amendment to subsection (F) of section 17-25-45 would resolve
both of these issues. The proposed amendment would impose a concrete timing
standard to eliminate the ambiguity in section 17-25-50. Framing this standard as a
proposed amendment to section 17-25-45(F), not a separate code section, would
eliminate any question as to whether courts should read this standard in light of
section 17-25-45.
Mary A. Gruenhagen
82. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(B) (West 2003).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45(A) (West 2003).
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